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Abstract
For increasing the production of new energy vehicles, 
government’s subsidy policy was implemented in the early 
stage of its development. This paper considers consumer 
subsidies and manufacturer subsidies, and modeling 
to compare the manufacturer’s optimal production and 
profit of two subsidy mechanisms under certainty and 
uncertainty demand. Research shows manufacturer’s 
supply and profit are the same under two subsidies with 
certain demands; we also show that the production supply 
is not always decreased with the increase of demands’ 
uncertain, and compare to manufacturer subsidies, 
consumer subsidies is more benefit the production of new 
energy vehicles for government.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, energy shortage and environmental pollution 
problems are becoming more serious, and have captured 
the attention of the public and government. For the 
sustainable development of society, to ease the energy 
crisis and improve air pollution, the government began to 
promote updating of automobile industry. For example, 
new energy vehicles have received significant interest 
in the last decade. However, in the early development 
of new energy vehicles, the factors such as restriction 
of core technologies, high cost of new energy vehicles, 
low acceptance of consumers and so on, restrict its 
development. Therefore, the government offers subsidies 
to promote the development of new energy vehicles. 
During The 12th Five-Year Plan, our government issued 
“energy saving and new energy automotive industry 
development plan (2012-2020)”, offering subsidies to 
expand the market demand. 
Currently, numerous papers focus on subsidy. Lobel 
and Perakis (2013) had research on the problem of 
optimizing subsidy policies for solar panels and present an 
empirical work of the German solar market. Alizamir et al. 
(2013) study the feed-in-tariff design problem, comparing 
strategies for welfare maximization and adoptions targets. 
Ovchinnikov and Raz (2013) study the public goods 
price problem with considering government subsidy. 
The authors compare different government intervention 
mechanisms and study under what conditions the system 
are coordinated with considering welfare. Zhou (2010) 
compare, for the case of certainty demand, different 
subsidy mechanisms.
Considering the subsidy policies for new energy 
vehicles, there is a significant amount of empirical work 
in the literature. For example, Gallagher and Muehlegger 
(2011) show that for hybrid cars, sales tax-free are more 
effective than income tax income tax credits. Sierzchula 
et al. (2014) present an empirical study of different 
countries, show that electric cars adoption rates are 
strongly correlated with financial incentives and charging 
infrastructure. Cheng (2010) shows that governments 
offer tax concessions and subsidy to promote the new 
energy vehicles industry after comparing the automotive 
industry policy of domestic and foreign. Sun et al. (2011) 
explore the ways to improve the effectiveness of subsidies 
by analyzing the existing subsidies policy for electric 
vehicles for domestic and foreign. Yang (2012) present 
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an empirical study of the impact of government subsidy 
and tax exemptions, infrastructure investment and electric 
vehicles R&D on consumers’ willingness to buy. Wang 
et al. (2013) the asymmetry of information will increase 
the motivation of enterprises strategic acquisition of 
subsidies, and bring a negative impact on the development 
of new energy vehicles.
Also in literature, one can find a vast amount of 
papers that focus on modeling research. Xiao (2014) 
compare, for the case of deterministic demand, different 
government subsidies mechanisms and study the impact 
of government subsidies on the demand and supply chain 
of new energy vehicles. For the new energy vehicles 
supply chain, Zhang and Wang (2015) analyze the impact 
of government subsidies on consumers and use Shapley 
value method to solve the problem of profit distribution of 
supply chain members. Zhang, Sheng and Meng (2015) 
use multi-agent method to study the problem of how the 
sales efforts of new energy vehicles can be encouraged 
with the government subsidy.
2012, our government announced the “energy saving 
and new energy automotive industry development plan”, 
note than the production of new energy vehicles will 
reach 2 million by 2020. Based on this, in our model the 
government is assumed to have an objective to maximize 
the quantities of new energy vehicles in the market. Our 
goals are (a) to study if the impact of demand on the 
manufacturer subsidy mechanism and consumer subsidy 
mechanism and (b) to compare the outcomes of both 
mechanisms.
1. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
For the problem of subsidizing the new energy vehicles, 
government makes the decision of subsidizing the 
manufacturer’s cost or the consumer. Offering subsidies 
directly to the manufacturer can be implemented by 
partially sharing the cost of production or in form of 
loans or free capital to the supplier. Offering rebates to 
the end consumers can expand the demands and improve 
consumer acceptance of new energy vehicles. We assume 
a single time period model with a unique supplier and 
consider a full information setting (see Figure 1). The 
government decides subsidy object and the supplier 
follows by setting the price p and production quantities Q 
to maximize his/her profit. 
Figure 1
Model
The variables and assumptions involved in this paper 
as follows: 
p ：the price of new energy vehicles
Q：the quantity of new energy vehicles
X ：the demand of new energy vehicles
c ：the cost of new energy vehicles
s ：the subsidy of new energy vehicle
b ：price-sensitive factor
Assuming c<p<2c for the high cost of new energy 
vehicles.
2. CERTAINTY DEMAND MODEL
This part considers linear and nonlinear demand 
respectively, compare the optimal price, outcome and 
profit of new energy vehicles of subsidy mechanism and 
consumer subsidy mechanism.
2.1 Linear Demand, Assuming the Demand of 
New Energy Vehicles Is X=a-b*p
(a) Subsidizing the consumer
The government provides a rebates s to consumers, 
given the subsidy level s, the supplier faces the following 
profit maximization problem. 
 )](*[*)(max
,
sPbacp cc
qp
c −−−=π  .
(b) Subsidizing the manufacturer
Instead of offering rebates to the end consumers, 
the government provides a subsidy s, directly to the 
manufacturer. Given a subsidy level s announced by 
the government, the supplier faces the following profit 
maximization problem. 
 )*(*)]([max
,
mm
qp
m Pbascp −−−=π  .
THEOREM 1.  Assume a  l inear  demand,  the 
comparisons for the manufacturer and consumer subsidy 
mechanism are given by:
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Remark 1. For linear deterministic demand, the 
quantity and profit of supplier are the same of both 
subsidy mechanisms.
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2.2 Nonlinear Demand, Assuming the Demand of 
New Energy Vehicles Is X=a*p-b, b>1
(a) Subsidizing the consumer
The government provides a rebates s to consumers, 
given the subsidy level s , the supplier faces the following 
profit maximization problem. 
 bcc
qp
c sPacp
−−−= )(**)(max
,
π .
(b) Subsidizing the manufacturer
Instead of offering rebates to the end consumers, 
the government provides a subsidy s , directly to the 
manufacturer. Given a subsidy level s  announced by 
the government, the supplier faces the following profit 
maximization problem. 
 bmm
qp
m Pascp
−−−= **)]([max
,
π .
THEOREM 2. Assume a nonlinear demand, the 
comparisons for the manufacturer and consumer subsidy 
mechanism are given by:
b
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Remark 2. For nonlinear deterministic demand, the 
quantity and profit of supplier are the same of both 
subsidy mechanisms.
3. UNCERTAINTY DEMAND MODEL
We denote that the total demand X of new energy vehicles 
follows a stochastic distribution with density function 
(pdf), f(x), and cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(x). 
And the manufacturer is price taker.
3.1 Subsidizing the Consumer
Assuming the subsidy s only influences the mean value of 
the demand. Then the pdf of the demand with subsidy is 
fs(x)=f(x-s) and the cdf is Fs(x)=F(x-s).
Therefore, the profits of the manufacturer as follows:
 cQsXQpc
qp
c −= ))(,min(*max
,
π .  
3.2 Subsidizing the Manufacturer
In this case, the government provides a subsidy s directly 
to the manufacturer, so the manufacturer’s cost is c s− , 
therefore the profits of the manufacturer as follows:
 QscXQp
qp
m )(),min(*max
,
−−=π .
3.3 Analysis
This paper uses the uniform distribution on  [ , ]u uσ σ− +
(u>σ)to describe the new energy vehicles demand without 
subsidy. Then we have
 f(x)=1/(2σ), F(x)=(x-u+σ)/(2σ) .
Therefore, the optimal expressions as follows:
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Where K is defined as: 
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p
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Corollary 1.
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Corollary 1 shows that for stochastic demand, 
profit of supplier is always decrease with the increase 
of uncertainty. But if s  is big enough, the quantity of 
new energy vehicles will be increase with the increase 
of uncertainty, this shows that when profit margins are 
smaller, the government should to increase the subsidy 
amount and share a larger part of risk to boost quantity. 
3.4 Computational Results
In this section, we present some numerical examples to 
illustrate the results found in the previous sections and to 
provide further insights. We consider that 
p=42000, c=36000,
                            u=40000, σ=5000-30000,
 s=10000 or s=16000.
Considering the impact of different values of on 
quantity and profit of both mechanisms. The plots are 
reported in Figure 2.
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Figure 2
Optimal Quantity and Profit
As can be seen from Figure 2, when s=10000(s<c-p/2), 
the optimal production and profits of both mechanisms are 
reduced with the increase of uncertainty. When s=16000 
(s>c-p/2), for manufacturer subsidies, the optimal 
production is increased with the increase of uncertainty. 
Also it can be seen that, in most cases (2σ<p), comparing 
the manufacture subsidy, the government offer subsidy 
to the consumers, the quantities and the profits of the 
supplier are greater. If 2σ>p, the demand uncertainty is 
large, the Government should share a large pare of the 
risk and offer subsidies to manufacture, to compensate for 
uncertain demand.
CONCLUSION
With the lack of energy, the development of new energy 
automotive industry can ease the pressure of energy crisis. 
The government offers subsidies in the early stage of 
new energy automotive industry. We propose a model to 
analyze the interaction between the government and the 
supplier when comparing different government subsidy 
mechanisms.
Focusing on the deterministic demand model, we 
find that the price consumers paid and the quantity 
manufacturer sold of both mechanisms are the same. For 
higher cost of new energy vehicles, the government will 
need to increase the subsidy amount. We also evaluate 
the uncertainty impact on supplier, it is found that the 
outcomes of new energy vehicles decreases with the 
increase of uncertainty, but consumer subsidy is more 
useful than manufacturer subsidy to increase the quantities 
of new energy vehicles. But when the uncertainty is big 
enough, the government should offer subsidy to supplier 
and pay a large share for the risk.
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